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The first device-independent quantum private query protocol (MRT17) which is proposed by
Maitra et al. [Phys. Rev. A 95, 042344 (2017)] to enhance the security through the certification of
the states and measurements. However, the MRT17 protocol works under an assumption of perfect
detectors, which increases difficulty in the implementations. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate
what would affect the security of this protocol if the detectors were imperfect. Meanwhile, Maitra
et al. also pointed out that this problem remains open. In this paper, we analyze the security of
MRT17 protocol when the detectors are imperfect and then find that this protocol is under attack in
the aforementioned case. Furthermore, we propose device-independent QPQ protocol without the
assumption of perfect detectors. Compared with MRT17 protocol, our protocol is more practical
without relaxing the security in the device-independent framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) [1] deals with the
problem that an user (Alice) knows the address of an
item from the database with N items which is held by
Bob and queries it secretly. In a PIR protocol, Alice
gets correctly the item that she queried, whereas Bob
does not know which item Alice has queried (i.e., the
perfect user privacy). Furthermore, a symmetrically pri-
vate information retrieval (SPIR) [2] has one more secu-
rity requirement that Alice cannot get other items from
the database except what she queried (i.e., the perfect
database security). However, the task of SPIR cannot be
realized ideally even in quantum cryptography [3].
As a quantum protocol for dealing with SPIR prob-
lems, quantum private query (QPQ) relaxes the security
requirements to some extent: i) Alice has nonzero prob-
ability to discover Bob’s attack if he attempts to learn
the address of Alice’s queried item, which is referred to
as cheat sensitivity. ii) Alice can gain a few more items
than the perfect requirement where she only obtains the
queried item.
In 2008, Giovannetti et al. [4] proposed the first cheat-
sensitive QPQ protocol (GLM08), where the database
was represented by a unitary operation (i.e., oracle op-
eration) and it was performed on the query/test states
at random, which were prepared by Alice. The query
states were to obtain the retrieved item and the test
states were to check potential attack from Bob. This
protocol reduces exponentially the communication and
computation complexity. Furthermore, the security of
GLM08 protocol has been analyzed strictly [5] and a
proof-of-principle experiment has been implemented [6].
Olejnik improved GLM08 protocol such that communi-
cation complexity was reduced further (O11)[7]. These
two protocols exhibit significant advantage in theory; but
for large database dimension, these protocols are not
practically implementable. To solve this problem, Ja-
cobi et al. [8] proposed a QPQ protocol (J11) based
on SARG04 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol
[9], where this kind of protocols were called as QKD-
based QPQ protocols. Compared with GLM08 and O11
protocols, J11 protocol can tolerate losses and be easily
implemented to a database with large dimension. Sub-
sequently, many QKD-based QPQ protocols [10–12] are
proposed and their security either better users privacy or
better database security even the perfect database secu-
rity is studied [13–16]. The development of QPQ proto-
cols can be referred to [17].
In the traditional QPQ protocol, Alice and Bob are re-
quired to trust their devices. If the states shared between
them are not in the predetermined form, then Alice can
always utilize some strategies which help her to elicit a
few more items than what is suggested by the protocol.
Thus, it is necessary for Bob to certify the states and
measurements. With the advent of device-independent
idea, the related cryptographic protocols do not rely on
any assumptions about the states and measurements in
their protocols. Zhao et al. [18] designed measurement
device independence (MDI) QPQ protocol to certify the
measurements (see Fig. 1). Later, Maitra, Paul and
Roy proposed a device-independent (DI) QPQ protocol
(MPR17) [19] to certify both states and measurements
before proceeding to QPQ part (see Fig. 2).
Obviously, MRT17 protocol enhances the security since
the states and measurements need not be trusted but
can be certified whether to be in a predetermined form.
While, this protocol works under an assumption of per-
fect detectors (i.e., detectors with unit efficiency), which
is hard to implement experimentally. If the assumption
is relaxed, how will it affect the security of MRT17 pro-
tocol?
In this paper, we solve this problem and propose a
DI-QPQ protocol without the assumption of perfect de-
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FIG. 1. The framework of MDI QPQ. MDI indicates that
measurement devices need not be characterized any more.
The grey dotted box represents that Alice need not trust the
Bell-state-measurement (BSM) device. BS and PBS repre-
sent the 50:50 beam splitter and polarization beam splitter,
respectively.
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FIG. 2. The framework of DI-QPQ. The grey box represents
that Bob need not trust the device of states and measurements
but certify the states and measurements via local CHSH Bell
game. When the observed value violates the critical value of
CHSH Bell game, QPQ part can be performed. Note that η
represents detection efficiency and assume η = 1 in MRT17
protocol.
tectors. Firstly, we analyze security threat for MRT17
protocol under the case that the assumption is relaxed
and the results show that this protocol is under attack in
the above case. Secondly, we propose DI-QPQ protocols
without the assumption of perfect detectors. Compared
with MRT17 protocol, our protocol not only maintains
the security in the DI framework but also is toward prac-
tical.
The remaining of the paper is as follows. The review
of DI-QPQ protocol with an assumption of perfect de-
tectors is given in Sect. II. DI-QPQ protocol without
the assumption of perfect detectors is proposed and the
security analysis is given in Sect. III. The conclusion is
summarized in the last section.
II. REVIEW DI-QPQ PROTOCOL WITH THE
ASSUMPTION OF PERFECT DETECTORS
The MRT17 protocol [19] is the first QPQ protocol
in the DI framework. Our protocol is built on MRT 17
protocol. In this section, we revisit MRT17 (DI-QPQ)
protocol [19].
In the DI framework, the assumptions about states
and measurements need not be made except for the ba-
sic ones. In the MRT17 protocol, the trustworthiness of
Bob’s devices can be removed, and Bob utilizes a statis-
tical method (known as CHSH Bell game) [21] to certify
whether the shared states and measurements are in the
predetermined forms between them.
Before introducing the details of MRT17 protocol, we
give the relation between CHSH Bell test and CHSH Bell
game.
In the standard CHSH Bell test,
1. xi ∈ {0, 1} and yi ∈ {0, 1} are chosen uniformly at
random. xi = 0(1) represents the measuring ob-
servables σz(σx); yi = 0(1) represents the measur-
ing observables σx+σz√
2
(σz−σx√
2
). The first and second
particle of the entangled state can be measured, re-
spectively. When the measurement result is |0〉 or
|+〉 (|1〉 or |−〉), then ai = 0(1). Similarly, the
definition of bi has been given.
2. CHSH Bell correlation function is described as
IˆCHSH = E(X0Y0) + E(X0Y1) + E(X1Y0)− E(X1Y1),
where
E(X0Y0) =
∑
ai,bi
(−1)ai+bip(ai, bi|xi = 0, yi = 0),
and others have similar definitions.
Now, if the shared state is |00〉+|11〉√
2
, then IˆCHSH = 2
√
2,
which corresponds to the maximal violation in quantum
theory.
In a general CHSH Bell test, the shared state is not the
maximally entangled state but general entangled state
and the measuring observables are {|ψ〉, |ψ⊥〉} for differ-
ent four angles, where
|ψ〉 = cos ψ
2
|0〉+ sin ψ
2
|1〉,
|ψ⊥〉 = sin ψ
2
|0〉 − cos ψ
2
|1〉.
(1)
3thus IˆCHSH ∈ (2, 2
√
2] in quantum theory.
The CHSH Bell test is considered as a nonlocal game.
Two players (P1,P2) are viewed as cooperating with
each other. A referee runs the game, and all communica-
tion is between the players and referee, while no commu-
nication directly between the players is permitted. The
referee selects randomly xiyi ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}. Then,
each player must answer a single bit (ai forP1, bi forP2).
They win if ai + bi = xi ∧ yi. CHSH correlation function
is characterized in the CHSH Bell test, while the aver-
age probability of success is described in the CHSH Bell
game. The average probability of success= 12 +
IˆCHSH
8 ,
[].
Next, we review the MRT17 protocol.
Firstly, the basic assumptions in the MRT17 protocol
are listed [19]:
A: The additional information in Alice and Bob’s labo-
ratories is not leaked.
B: Each use of device is independent of the previous uses.
C: All the detectors of Bob are perfect, i.e., unit effi-
ciency.
The details of MRT17 protocol are introduced [19].
1. Bob starts with N entangled states which may be
prepared by Alice.
2. Bob chooses some entangled states at random,
which forms ΓCHSH for CHSH Bell test. ΓCHSH
contains ⌈γN⌉ entangled states, where 0 < γ < 1.
The remained entangled states constitute ΓQPQ for
QPQ protocol which contains ⌊(1−γ)N⌋ entangled
states.
3. For CHSH Bell game, i ∈ {1, ..., ⌈γN⌉},
(a) Bob chooses xi ∈ {0, 1} and yi ∈ {0, 1} uni-
formly at random.
(b) If xi = 0(1), he measures the first par-
ticle of the entangled state in the basis
{|0〉, |1〉}({|+〉, |−〉}), then denote ai = 0(1)
when the measurement result is |0〉 or |+〉 (|1〉
or |−〉). In the same manner, if yi = 0(1), he
measures the second particle of the entangled
state in the basis {|ψ1〉, |ψ⊥1 〉}({|ψ2〉, |ψ⊥2 〉}),
then denote bi = 0(1) when the measurement
result is |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉 (|ψ⊥1 〉 or |ψ⊥2 〉), where
|ψl〉 = cos ψl
2
|0〉+ sin ψl
2
|1〉,
|ψ⊥l 〉 = sin
ψl
2
|0〉 − cos ψl
2
|1〉
(2)
for l ∈ {1, 2}, ψ1 ∈ (0, π2 ), ψ2 ∈ (π2 , π) and
ψ1 + ψ2 = π.
(c) Statistical method 1: define Yi be the observed
result of the ith game for players, i.e.,
Yi =
{
1, if ai + bi = xi ∧ yi,
0, otherwise,
(3)
and let Y be the average observed probability
of success in the CHSH Bell game,
Y = 1⌈γN⌉
∑
i
Yi. (4)
If
Y < Y¯, (5)
then Bob aborts the protocol, where Y¯ repre-
sents the average probability of success,
Y¯ =1
8
[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1
− cosψ2] + 1
2
.
(6)
Otherwise, he proceeds to the following QPQ
protocol [11].
4. For QPQ part, the condition must be satisfied that
the local CHSH Bell game at Bob’s end violates the
above relation (5), thus the states shared between
Alice and Bob are certified to be in their predeter-
mined form, i.e.,
ΨBA =
1√
2
(|0〉B|φ0〉A + |1〉B|φ1〉A), (7)
where
|φ0〉A = cos θ
2
|0〉+ sin θ
2
|1〉, (8)
|φ1〉A = cos θ
2
|0〉 − sin θ
2
|1〉, (9)
for θ ∈ (0, π2 ).
Next, Bob uses the remaining ⌊(1−γ)N⌋ entangled
pairs to proceed to QPQ steps.
(a) Bob sends a particle A in each certified entan-
gled pair (7) to Alice.
(b) Alice announces whether she has successfully
received the particle or not. For un-received
particle of Alice, Bob discards the correspond-
ing particle.
(c) Then, Bob measures his particle in the
basis {|0〉, |1〉}, Alice measures the corre-
sponding particle in the basis {|φ0〉, |φ⊥0 〉} or
{|φ1〉, |φ⊥1 〉}. If Alice’s measurement outcome
is |φ⊥0 〉 ( |φ⊥1 〉), she can conclude that the raw
key bit at Bob’s end is 1 (0), and then the
success probability that Alice gains a bit is
showed in Table I.
4TABLE I. The success probability that Alice obtains a key.
classical coding 0 1 1 0
|φ0〉A |φ
⊥
0 〉A |φ1〉A |φ
⊥
1 〉A
0 |0〉B
1
2
0 1
2
cos2 θ 1
2
sin2 θ
1 |1〉B
1
2
cos2 θ 1
2
sin2 θ 1
2
0
(d) Alice’s measurements yield conclusive results
and inconclusive ones. Both conclusive and
inconclusive results are stored. Alice and Bob
now share a raw key string (i.e., K). Bob
knows the whole raw key string, whereas Alice
generally knows the part of K, i,e., sin
2 θ
2 |K|,
where |K| represents the number of K.
(e) Alice and Bob postprocess K so that Alice’s
known key bits of K are reduced to 1 bit.
(f) Bob encrypts his database so that Alice only
obtains the item that she queried.
Different from traditional QPQ protocol, MRT17 pro-
tocol can certify whether the states and measurements to
be in their predetermined forms. Thus, MRT17 protocol
has an advantage of improving the security.
III. DI-QPQ PROTOCOL WITHOUT THE
ASSUMPTION OF PERFECT DETECTORS
In this section, we discuss the security of MRT17 pro-
tocol when the assumption is relaxed. Then, we propose
DI-QPQ protocol without the assumption of perfect de-
tectors.
In general, the security analysis of QKD introduces
an outside adversary (Eve) and investigates the effect of
Eve’s attack, then rules out it. Different from QKD, each
of the two parties may be an attacker for the counterpart
in a QPQ protocol. Two cases are included in the security
analysis: i) Alice tries to extract more information about
the raw keys, or ii) Bob tries his best to learn the address
of item that Alice queries.
A. The attack against MRT17 protocol if the
detectors are imperfect
By considering a general attack scenario that Alice,
as an adversary, tries to elicit more information from the
raw keys, we discuss the security of MRT17 protocol with
the assumption of perfect detectors via two statistical
methods from CHSH Bell game/test, respectively. Fur-
thermore, when the assumption is relaxed, we show that
MRT17 protocol is under attack.
Suppose that Alice has ability to prepare the biased
states such that the state is in the following form
α|0〉B |φ0〉A + β|1〉B |φ1〉A, (10)
where
α =
√
1
2
+ ǫ, β =
√
1
2
− ǫ,
ǫ ∈ (−1
2
, 0) ∪ (0, 1
2
),
(11)
the difference between them lies in α, β compared with
the predetermined state (7).
Firstly, we show that Alice’s attack does not work for
MRT17 protocol with the assumption of perfect detector
no matter which statistical method is from CHSH Bell
game/test.
(1) the shared state in MRT17 protocol is certified in the
way of nonlocal game.
After local CHSH Bell game, Bob gets
Y = 1
8
sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) +
√
1
4 − ǫ2
4
(cosψ1 − cosψ2)
+
1
2
,
(12)
this value (12) cannot violate the condition (5) for an
arbitrary value of ǫ (i.e., ∈ (− 12 , 0)∪(0, 12 )), and the proof
is given Appendix A. According to the rules of MRT17
protocol, this protocol can be terminated. Obviously,
Alice’s attack does not work for MRT17 protocol with
the prefect detectors.
(2) the shared state in MRT17 protocol is certified in the
way of CHSH Bell test. Statistical method of CHSH Bell
test is in the following:
instead of steps (3)-(4), Statistical method 2 : denote
Ii as the observed result in the ith experiment.
Ii
=
∑
ai,bi,xi,yi
(−1)ai⊕bi⊕xiyi χ(ai = a, bi = b, xi = x, yi = y)
p(xi, yi)
,
(13)
where
χ(x) =
{
1, x is observed;
0, otherwise;
(14)
ICHSH represents the observed value of CHSH Bell
correlation function, i.e.,
ICHSH =
1
⌈γN⌉
⌈γN⌉∑
i=1
Ii. (15)
5When N →∞, IˆCHSH can be represented as
IˆCHSH =
1
⌈γN⌉
⌈γN⌉∑
i=1
∑
ai,bi,xi,yi
(−1)ai+bi+xiyi χ(ai = a,
bi = b, xi = x, yi = y)
p(xi, yi)
=
1
p(xi, yi)
⌈γN⌉∑
i=1
∑
ai,bi,xi,yi
(−1)ai+bi+xiyi χ(ai = a,
bi = b, xi = x, yi = y)
⌈γN⌉
=
1
p(x, y)
∑
a,b,x,y
(−1)a+b+xyp(a, b, x, y)
=
∑
a,b,x,y
(−1)a+b+xyp(a, b|x, y)
=
∑
a,b
(−1)a+b[p(a, b|X0, Y0) + p(a, b|X0, Y1)+
p(a, b|X1, Y0)− p(a, b|X1, Y1)
=E(X0Y0) + E(X0Y1) + E(X1Y0)− E(X1Y1).
(16)
If
ICHSH < IˆCHSH , (17)
where
IˆCHSH = sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2, (18)
Bob aborts the protocol. Otherwise, Bob proceeds to
the QPQ part. Note that the deduction of (18) can be
referred to Appendix B.
Hence, based on the state (44) and statistical method
2, Bob gets
ICHSH = sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + 2
√
1
4
− ǫ2(cosψ1
− cosψ2).
(19)
This value cannot violate the condition (17), the proof
can be given in Appendix C.
To summarize, these two statistical methods can de-
tect Alice’s attack that the states are not in the prede-
termined forms. These two statistical methods are equiv-
alent.
Next, when the assumption is relaxed, we show that
MRT17 protocol can be attacked successfully via Alice’s
strategy that uses biased state (44).
We make use of statistical method 2 to catch the in-
fluence of the imperfect detectors. When the detection
efficiency of Bob’s detectors is not limited to be unit,
denoted as η, i.e.,
η = min
j,k
{p(ΛXj ), p(ΛYk)} (20)
where ΛXj (ΛYk) represents the subensemble of nonempty
outputs (i.e, a(b) ∈ {0, 1}) when choosing measurement
Xj(Yk).
When the detectors are imperfect, the value of ICHSH
with the biased state (44) is
ICHSH =
8− 2[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + 2
√
1
4 − ǫ2
η
(cosψ1 − cosψ2)]
+ 3[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2)+
2
√
1
4
− ǫ2(cosψ1 − cosψ2)]− 8.
(21)
When η and ǫ satisfy the following cases:
Case 1:
2
1 +
√
2
< η <
8− 2A
8− 2A+B < 1,
ǫ ∈ (−1
2
, 0) ∪ (0, 1
2
);
(22)
Case 2:
2
1 +
√
2
<
8− 2A
8− 2A+B < η <
8− 2A− 2B
8− 2A− 2B ,
ǫ ∈ (−
√
(3η − 2)2B2 − C2
2(3η − 2)B , 0) ∪ (0,
√
(3η − 2)2B2 − C2
2(3η − 2)B ),
(23)
where
A = sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2), (24)
B = cosψ1 − cosψ2, (25)
C = (8− 2A+B)η − 8 + 2A. (26)
Eq.(21) violates the relation (17)(the proof is given in
Appendix D), thus Bob proceeds to QPQ part. In the
above cases, Alice successfully cheats Bob to make Bob
believe that the states in his hand are in predetermined
form which actually are not. In this way, the success
probability of Alice’s guessing keys from the raw keys is
(12 +2ǫ
2) sin2 θ. Compared with p = sin
2 θ
2 , Alice success-
fully gets more information from Bob’s database without
being caught. Therefore, when the detectors are not per-
fect, MRT17 protocol is insecure.
B. DI-QPQ protocol without the assumption of
perfect detectors
According to the part A, we find that MRT17 proto-
col suffers an attack when the detectors are imperfect.
How to design a DI-QPQ protocol without the assump-
tion of perfect detectors becomes crucial. We rule out
the influence of detector inefficiency and then propose
DI-QPQ protocol without the assumption of perfect de-
tectors. Our assumptions now are relaxed to the first two
ones of MRT17 protocol. That is,
6A: the additional information in Alice and Bob’s labora-
tories is no leaked.
B: each use of device is independent of the previous uses.
Denote the detection efficiency of Bob’s detectors as
η. The procedures of DI-QPQ protocol without the as-
sumption of perfect detectors are as follows:
1. Bob starts with N entangled states which may be
prepared by Alice.
2. Bob chooses some entangled states at random,
which forms ΓCHSH for CHSH Bell test. ΓCHSH
contains ⌈γN⌉ entangled states, where 0 < γ < 1.
The remained entangled states constitute ΓQPQ for
QPQ protocol which contains ⌊(1−γ)N⌋ entangled
states.
3. For CHSH Bell test, i ∈ {1, ..., ⌈γN⌉},
(a) Bob chooses xi ∈ {0, 1} and yi ∈ {0, 1} uni-
formly at random.
(b) If xi = 0(1), he measures the first par-
ticle of the entangled state in the basis
{|0〉, |1〉}({|+〉, |−〉}), then denotes ai = 0(1)
when the measurement result is |0〉 or |+〉 (|1〉
or |−〉). In the same manner, if yi = 0(1), he
measures the second particle of the entangled
state in the basis {|ψ1〉, |ψ⊥1 〉}({|ψ2〉, |ψ⊥2 〉}),
then denotes bi = 0(1) when the measurement
result is |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉 (|ψ⊥1 〉 or |ψ⊥2 〉), where
|ψl〉 = cos ψl
2
|0〉+ sin ψl
2
|1〉,
|ψ⊥l 〉 = sin
ψl
2
|0〉 − cos ψl
2
|1〉
(27)
for l ∈ {1, 2}, ψ1 ∈ (0, π2 ), ψ2 ∈ (π2 , π) and
ψ1 + ψ2 = π.
(c) Statistical method 2 :
Ii
=
∑
ai,bi,xi,yi
(−1)ai+bi+xiyi χ(ai = a, bi = b, xi = x, yi = y)
p(xi, yi)
,
(28)
where Ii represents the observed result in the
ith experiment.
ICHSH =
1
⌈γN⌉
⌈γN⌉∑
i=1
Ii, (29)
ICHSH represents the observed value of CHSH
Bell correlation function.
(d) If
ICHSH < I¯CHSH , (30)
where
I¯CHSH = −8 + 3[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2]
+
8− 2[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2]
η
,
(31)
I¯CHSH represents the value of CHSH Bell cor-
relation function.
(e) For QPQ part, the condition must be satisfied
that the local CHSH Bell test at Bob’s end vi-
olates the above relation (30), thus the states
shared between Alice and Bob are certified to
be in their predetermined form, i.e.,
ΨBA =
1√
2
(|0〉B|φ0〉A + |1〉B|φ1〉A), (32)
where
|φ0〉A = cos θ
2
|0〉+ sin θ
2
|1〉, (33)
|φ1〉A = cos θ
2
|0〉 − sin θ
2
|1〉, (34)
for θ ∈ (0, π2 ).
Next, Bob uses the remaining ⌊(1 − γ)N⌋ en-
tangled pairs to proceed to QPQ steps which
are the same as that of MRT17 protocol.
Note that the deduction of I¯CHSH can be referred to
Appendix E
In the following, we show the relation among θ, detec-
tion efficiency (η) and the value of I¯CHSH when ψ1 =
π/4, ψ2 = 3π/4 (see Fig. 3).
FIG. 3. The relation among θ, η and the value of I¯CHSH
when ψ1 = pi/4, ψ2 = 3pi/4. The red line represents the result
of MRT17 protocol with assumption of perfect detectors.
From Fig. 3, the value of I¯CHSH rules out the effect
of detector inefficiency. When ICHSH = I¯CHSH , the
7shared state is predetermined one; otherwise it is not. In
particular, we show the relations between I¯CHSH and θ
when fixing the values of detection efficiency, i.e., η =
1, 0.83, respectively.
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FIG. 4. The relation between the value of I¯CHSH and θ con-
ditioned that η = 1. The three lines represent these relations
of different values of (ψ1, ψ2) = (pi/4, 3pi/4), (3pi/16, 13pi/16)
and (9pi/32, 23pi/32), respectively.
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FIG. 5. The relation between the value of I¯CHSH and θ
conditioned that η = 0.83. The three lines represent these
relations when (ψ1, ψ2) = (pi/4, 3pi/4), (3pi/16, 13pi/16) and
(9pi/32, 23pi/32), respectively.
C. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol.
Theorem 1 Suppose that there are N pairs of entangled
states in DI-QPQ protocol without the assumption of per-
fect detectors, these entangled states are divided randomly
into two parts: ΓCHSH ⊂ {1, · · · , N} of size ⌈γN⌉ with
0 < γ < 1 and ΓQPQ = {1, · · · , N}\ΓCHSH .If
ICHSH = I¯CHSH − ξ (35)
is satisfied in the local CHSH Bell test, and then the re-
lation (35) is still satisfied in the QPQ part with a negli-
gible statistical deviation v, where ICHSH represents the
observed value of CHSH Bell test, and I¯CHSH represents
the value of CHSH Bell test in predetermined states and
measurements in our protocol.
ξ =
√
1
2⌈γN⌉ ln
1
εCHSH
,
v =
√
(N − ⌈γN⌉+ 1)⌊(1− γ)N⌋2 ln 1
εQPQ
2⌈γN⌉N3 ,
(36)
εCHSH and εQPQ are negligible small values.
proof : Different from the proof of MRT17 protocol, Ii
can be rewritten as
Ii =
{
(−1)a+b+xy
p(x,y) , if (ai, bi, xi, yi) = (a, b, x, y) is observed;
0, otherwise.
(37)
Then, ICHSH =
1
⌈γN⌉
∑
i∈ΓCHSH Ii is called as the ob-
served average value. The expected value of ICHSH is
I¯CHSH .
Based on the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [23], we get
p(|ICHSH − I¯CHSH | ≥ ξ) ≤ exp(−2ξ2⌈γN⌉). (38)
Let εCHSH = exp(−2ξ2⌈γN⌉), we get
ξ =
√
1
2⌈γN⌉ ln
1
εCHSH
. (39)
Further, denote I ′CHSH =
1
⌊(1−γ)N⌋
∑
i∈ΓQPQ Ii and
I = 1
N
∑
i∈{1,...,N} Ii, we have
p(|ICHSH − I| ≥ v) ≤ exp( −2v
2⌈γN⌉N
N − ⌈γN⌉+ 1), (40)
Due to I = 1
N
∑
i∈{1,...,N} Ii =
⌈γN⌉
N
ICHSH +
⌊(1−γ)N⌋
N
I ′CHSH , Eq. (40) can be rewritten as
p(|ICHSH − I| ≥ v)
= p(|ICHSH − ⌈γN⌉
N
ICHSH − ⌊(1− γ)N⌋
N
I ′CHSH | ≥ v)
= p(| ⌊(1− γ)N⌋
N
(ICHSH − I ′CHSH)| ≥ v)
≤ exp( −2v
2⌈γN⌉N
N − ⌈γN⌉+ 1).
(41)
8Then, we have
p(|ICHSH − I ′CHSH | ≥
N
⌊(1− γ)N⌋v) ≤ εQPQ, (42)
Let εQPQ = exp(
−2v2⌈γN⌉N3
(N−⌈γN⌉+1)⌊(1−γ)N⌋2 ), hence,
v =
√
(N − ⌈γN⌉+ 1)⌊(1− γ)N⌋2 ln 1
εQPQ
2⌈γN⌉N3 . (43)
⊓⊔
proposition 1 For DI-QPQ protocol without the as-
sumption of perfect detectors, under the condition that
the relation ICHSH < I¯CHSH is violated for the subset
ΓCHSH , Bob can proceed to the QPQ part for the re-
maining subset ΓQPQ securely when N →∞.
Note that ΓCHSH(ΓQPQ) represents the subset of entan-
gled states that performs the local CHSH Bell test(QPQ
part), ICHSH represents the observed value of CHSH Bell
correlation function, and I¯CHSH represents the value of
CHSH Bell correlation function in predetermined states
and measurements.
To sum up, on the basis of Theorem 1, when N →∞,
the expression of ξ tends to 0. This indicates that the
certified states in the ΓCHSH are in the predetermined
form. Furthermore, the states in the ΓQPQ can be cer-
tified, although the states in the ΓQPQ are not executed
local CHSH Bell test. Associated with proposition 1, our
protocol is secure.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Discussion
When the state shared Alice and Bob is ǫ-close to the
one given in Eq.(7), our protocol also works.
The state shared between them is descried as
α|0〉B |φ0〉A + β|1〉B |φ1〉A, (44)
where
α =
√
1
2
+ ǫ, β =
√
1
2
− ǫ,
ǫ ∈ (−1
2
, 0) ∪ (0, 1
2
),
(45)
denoted as Ψ˜〉BA. When ǫ = 0, then Ψ˜〉BA = Ψ〉BA.
If Alice and Bob agree to use Ψ˜〉BA for performing our
protocol, our protocol is unchanging except for the value
I¯CHSH . the value I¯CHSH is changed to
I¯CHSH =
8− 2[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + 2αβ
η
(cosψ1 − cosψ2)]
+ 3[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2)+
2αβ(cosψ1 − cosψ2)]− 8.
(46)
When completing this protocol, Bob knows that the
number of Alice’s exacted keys is (12 + 2ǫ
2) sin2 θ|K|.
Thus, Bob utilizes a suitable postprocessing such that
Alice’s known key bits are reduced to 1 bit. Obviously,
Alice does not obtain more items than the item that she
queried. Further, this protocol is secure.
It is not hard to find that Ψ˜〉BA is the same as the
state in the adversary scenario in III.A. Compared with
the case in adversary scenario, the difference lies in:
1)Alice and Bob agree to use Ψ˜〉BA for carrying out DI-
QPQ protocol;
2) Bob certifies whether the shared states are Ψ˜〉BA or
not;
3) Different from Eq.(6) and Eq.(18), the critical value
(i.e., I¯CHSH) is changed;
4) Bob knows that the number of Alice’s known keys is
not sin
2 θ
2 |K| but (12+2ǫ2) sin2 θ|K|, which helps to choose
appropriate postprocessing.
B. Conlusion
In this paper, we analyzed the security of MRT17 pro-
tocol when the detectors were imperfect and found this
protocol was insecure in the above case. Furthermore,
we proposed DI-QPQ protocol without the assumption
of perfect detectors. Compared with MRT17 protocol,
our protocol is towards practical and maintains the secu-
rity in the DI framework.
But, some issues in DI-QPQ protocol are deserved to
investigate in the future.
(1) Bell tests play an important role in the DI framework.
While, Bell test encounters some loopholes such as free
of choice loophole,detection loophole. We investigate or
construct loophole-free Bell test to be adequate for DI-
QPQ protocol.
(2) Novel DI-QPQ protocol which achieves better perfor-
mance need be proposed. For example, a multi-bit block
from the database in one query can be retrieved.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We appreciate the anonymous reviewers for their
valuable suggestions and are grateful to Ya Cao,
Runze Li for providing materials and helpful discus-
sions. This work is supported by NSFC (Grant Nos.
61802033, 61672110, 61702469, 61771439, 61701553),
National Cryptography Development Fund (Grant No.
MMJJ20170120), Sichuan Youth Science and Technology
Foundation(Grant No. 2017JQ0045).
V. APPENDIX
Appendix A: The result of Eq. (12) cannot
violate the relation (5)
9First, we give the deduction of Eq. (12) as follows.
p(ai ⊕ bi = xi ∧ yi)
= pX,Y (0, 0)[p(0, 0|0, 0) + p(1, 1|0, 0)]
+ pX,Y (0, 1)[p(0, 0|0, 1) + p(1, 1|0, 1)]
+ pX,Y (1, 0)[p(0, 0|1, 0) + p(1, 1|1, 0)]
+ pX,Y (1, 1)[p(0, 1|1, 1) + p(1, 0|1, 1)]
=
1
4
[α2 cos2(
θ − ψ1
2
) + β2 sin2(
θ + ψ1
2
)]
+
1
4
[α2 cos2(
θ − ψ2
2
) + β2 sin2(
θ + ψ2
2
)]
+
1
4
[(
α+ β√
2
cos
ψ1
2
cos
θ
2
+
α− β√
2
sin
ψ1
2
sin
θ
2
)2
+ (
α − β√
2
sin
ψ1
2
cos
θ
2
− α+ β√
2
cos
ψ1
2
sin
θ
2
)2]
+
1
4
[(
α+ β√
2
sin
ψ2
2
cos
θ
2
− α− β√
2
cos
ψ2
2
sin
θ
2
)2
+ (
α − β√
2
cos
ψ2
2
cos
θ
2
+
α+ β√
2
sin
ψ2
2
sin
θ
2
)2]
(47)
=
1
8
sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) +
√
1
4 − ǫ2
4
(cosψ1 − cosψ2)
+
cos θ
4
(cosψ1 + cosψ2)ǫ +
1
2
=
1
8
sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) +
√
1
4 − ǫ2
4
(cosψ1 − cosψ2)
+
1
2
,
(48)
where p(0, 0|0, 0) = tr(|ΨBA〉〈ΨBA||0〉〈0| ⊗ |ψ1〉〈ψ1|),
other probabilities have similar operation method. The
last equality holds since cosψ1 + cosψ2 = 0.
Next, we prove that the above result cannot violate the
relation (5). Denote the result of Eq. (12) as f1, and let
1
8 [sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2] + 12 be f0.
F (ǫ) = f1 − f0
=
2
√
1
4 − ǫ2 − 1
8
(cosψ1 − cosψ2).
(49)
Via derivation of F with respect to ǫ, we get
F ′(ǫ) = −1
4
(cosψ1 − cosψ2) ǫ√
1
4 − ǫ2
. (50)
Case 1) when ǫ ∈ (0, 12 ), we get
F ′(ǫ) < 0,
F (0) = 0.
(51)
Case 2) when ǫ ∈ (− 12 , 0), we get
F ′(ǫ) > 0,
F (0) = 0.
(52)
Hence, when ǫ ∈ (− 12 , 0) ∪ (0, 12 ), we get F (ǫ) < 0. That
is, f1 < f0. Therefore, Eq. (12) cannot violate the rela-
tion Eq. (5). ⊓⊔
Appendix B: the deduction of Eq. (18)
We deduce E(X0Y0), E(X0Y1), E(X1Y0) and
E(X1Y1), respectively.
E(X0Y0) =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
(−1)abp(a, b|X0, Y0)
=
∑
a′,b′∈{1,−1}
a′b′p(a′, b′|X0, Y0)
= p(1, 1|X0, Y0) + p(−1,−1|X0, Y0)
− p(−1, 1|X0, Y0)− p(1,−1|X0, Y0)
=
1
2
cos2(
θ − ψ1
2
) +
1
2
sin2(
θ + ψ1
2
)
− 1
2
sin2(
θ − ψ1
2
)− 1
2
cos2(
θ + ψ1
2
)
=
1
2
cos(θ − ψ1)− 1
2
cos(θ + ψ1)
= sin θ sinψ1,
(53)
where p(1, 1|X0, Y0) = tr(|ΨBA〉〈ΨBA||0〉〈0| ⊗ |ψ1〉〈ψ1|),
other probabilities have similar operation methods.
E(X0Y1) =
∑
a′,b′∈{1,−1}
a′b′p(a′, b′|X0, Y1)
= p(1, 1|X0, Y1) + p(−1,−1|X0, Y1)
− p(−1, 1|X0, Y1)− p(1,−1|X0, Y1)
=
1
2
cos2(
θ − ψ2
2
) +
1
2
sin2(
θ + ψ2
2
)
− 1
2
sin2(
θ − ψ2
2
)− 1
2
cos2(
θ + ψ2
2
)
=
1
2
cos(θ − ψ2)− 1
2
cos(θ + ψ2)
= sin θ sinψ2,
(54)
where p(1, 1|X0, Y1) = tr(|ΨBA〉〈ΨBA||0〉〈0| ⊗ |ψ2〉〈ψ2|),
other probabilities have similar operation methods.
E(X1Y0) =
∑
a′,b′∈{1,−1}
a′b′p(a′, b′|X1, Y0)
= p(1, 1|X1, Y0) + p(−1,−1|X1, Y0)
− p(−1, 1|X1, Y0)− p(1,−1|X1, Y0)
= cos2(
θ
2
) cos2(
ψ1
2
) + sin2(
θ
2
) cos2(
ψ1
2
)
− cos2(θ
2
) sin2(
ψ1
2
)− sin2(θ
2
) cos2(
ψ1
2
)
= cos2(
θ
2
) cos(ψ1) + sin
2(
θ
2
) cos(ψ1)
= cosψ1,
(55)
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where p(1, 1|X1, Y0) = tr(|ΨBA〉〈ΨBA||+〉〈+|⊗|ψ1〉〈ψ1|),
other probabilities have similar operation methods.
E(X1Y1) =
∑
a′,b′∈{1,−1}
a′b′p(a′, b′|X1, Y1)
= p(1, 1|X1, Y1) + p(−1,−1|X1, Y1)
− p(−1, 1|X1, Y1)− p(1,−1|X1, Y1)
= cos2(
θ
2
) cos2(
ψ2
2
) + sin2(
θ
2
) cos2(
ψ2
2
)
− cos2(θ
2
) sin2(
ψ2
2
)− sin2(θ
2
) cos2(
ψ2
2
)
= cos2(
θ
2
) cos(ψ1) + sin
2(
θ
2
) cos(ψ1)
= cosψ2,
(56)
where p(1, 1|X1, Y1) = tr(|ΨBA〉〈ΨBA||+〉〈+|⊗|ψ2〉〈ψ2|),
other probabilities have similar operation methods.
Based on the above the results (53)-(56), we get
IˆCHSH = E(X0Y0) + E(X0Y1) + E(X1Y0)− E(X1Y1)
= sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2.
(57)
⊓⊔
Appendix C: Eq. (19) cannot violate the
relation (17)
The deduction of (19) is similar to that of (18). Differ-
ent from Eq. (18), the deduction of each probability term
in Eq.(19) uses the state (44) instead of |ΨBA〉. Thus,
we get
E(X0Y0) = sin θ sinψ1 + 2 cos θ cosψ1ǫ,
E(X0Y1) = sin θ sinψ2 + 2 cos θ cosψ2ǫ,
E(X1Y0) = 2
√
1
4
− ǫ2 cosψ1,
E(X1Y1) = 2
√
1
4
− ǫ2 cosψ2.
(58)
Hence, we have
ICHSH =sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + 2 cos θ(cosψ1 + cosψ2)ǫ
+ 2
√
1
4
− ǫ2(cosψ1 − cosψ2)
= sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + 2
√
1
4
− ǫ2(cosψ1 − cosψ2),
(59)
the last equality holds since cosψ1 + cosψ2 = 0.
Next, we prove that the above result cannot violate the
relation (18). Denote the result of Eq. (19) as g1, and
let sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2 be g0.
F (ǫ) = g1 − g0
= (2
√
1
4
− ǫ2 − 1)(cosψ1 − cosψ2).
(60)
Via derivation of F with respect to ǫ, we get
F ′(ǫ) = −2(cosψ1 − cosψ2) ǫ√
1
4 − ǫ2
. (61)
Case 1) when ǫ ∈ (0, 12 ), we have
F ′(ǫ) < 0,
F (0) = 0.
(62)
Case 2) when ǫ ∈ (− 12 , 0), we have
F ′(ǫ) > 0,
F (0) = 0.
(63)
Hence, when ǫ ∈ (− 12 , 0) ∪ (0, 12 ),we get F (ǫ) < 0. That
is, g1 < g0. In short, Eq. (19) cannot violate the relation
Eq. (18). ⊓⊔
Appendix D: Eq. (21) violates the relation (17)
First, we deduce Eq. (21) in the following.
In the perfect detector scenario (i.e., η = 1), when the
state is in the form (44), Eq. (19) holds. When η 6= 1,
Eq. (19) can be rewritten as
E(X0Y0|Λ0) + E(X0Y1|Λ0) + E(X1Y0|Λ0)− E(X1Y1|Λ0)
= sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + 2
√
1
4
− ǫ2(cosψ1 − cosψ2),
(64)
where Λ0 = ΛX0Y0X1Y1 represents the ensemble that
an arbitrary measurement pair gives the nonempty out-
comes (i.e., a′, b′ ∈ {+1,−1}).
E(XjYk|Λ0) is inaccessible in the actual experiment,
while E(XjYk|ΛXjYk) is calculated easily in the above
situation. So, in order to get the relation between
E(XjYk|Λ0) and E(XjYk|ΛXjYk), we define
δ = min
(j,k)
p(Λ0|ΛXjYk), (65)
where min(j,k) can be obtained by taking over all the
measurement settings for j, k ∈ {0, 1}.
The relation between E(XjYk|ΛXjYk) and E(XjYk|Λ0)
is given by
|E(XjYk|ΛXjYk)− δE(XjYk|Λ0)| ≤ 1− δ (66)
for j, k ∈ {0, 1}.
proof Define Λ0 = ΛXjYk \ Λ0, which satisfies that
Λ0 ∩ Λ0 = ∅,
Λ0 ∪ Λ0 = ΛXjYk .
(67)
Hence, we can get
E(XjYk|ΛXjYk) = E(XjYk|Λ0 ∪ Λ0)
=p(Λ0|ΛXjYk)E(XjYk|Λ0) + p(Λ0|ΛXjYk)E(XjYk|Λ0).
(68)
11
Next, we have
|E(XjYk|ΛXjYk)− δE(XjYk|Λ0)|
=|p(Λ0|ΛXjYk)E(XjYk|Λ0) + p(Λ0|ΛXjYk)E(XjYk|Λ0)
− δE(XjYk|Λ0)|
≤|p(Λ0|ΛXjYk)E(XjYk|Λ0)|+ |p(Λ0|ΛXjYk)E(XjYk|Λ0)
− δE(XjYk|Λ0)|
≤p(Λ0|ΛXjYk)E(|XjYk||Λ0) + (p(Λ0|ΛXjYk)− δ)
E(|XjYk||Λ0)
≤1− δ,
(69)
where E(|XjYk|) =
∑
a′,b′ |a′b′|p(a′, b′|Xj , Yk). The first
inequality holds based on |x+ y− z| ≤ |x|+ |y− z|. The
second inequality holds based on |E(xy)| ≤ E(|xy|). The
last inequality holds on the basis of E(|XjYk||Λ0) = 1
and E(|XjYk||Λ0) = 1 since |a′b′| = 1 for a′, b′ ∈
{+1,−1}. ⊓⊔
Furthermore, in an actual experiment, we get
ICHSH
=|E(X0Y0|ΛX0Y0) + E(X0Y1|ΛX0Y1) + E(X1Y0|ΛX1Y0)
− E(X1Y1|ΛX1Y1)|
=|E(X0Y0|ΛX0Y0)− δE(X0Y0|Λ0) + δE(X0Y0|Λ0)
+E(X0Y1|ΛX0Y1)− δE(X0Y1|Λ0) + δE(X0Y1|Λ0)
+E(X1Y0|ΛX1Y0)− δE(X1Y0|Λ0) + δE(X1Y0|Λ0)
−(E(X1Y1|ΛX1Y1) + δE(X1Y1|Λ0)− δE(X1Y1|Λ0))|.
(70)
Via the property of the absolute value, Eq. (70) can
be rewritten as
ICHSH ≤|E(X0Y0|ΛX0Y0)− δE(X0Y0|Λ0)|
+ |E(X0Y1|ΛX0Y1)− δE(X0Y1|Λ0)|
+ |E(X1Y0|ΛX1Y0)− δE(X1Y0|Λ0)|
+ |(E(X1Y1|ΛX1Y1)− δE(X1Y1|Λ0)|
+ δ|E(X0Y0|Λ0) + E(X0Y1|Λ0) + E(X1Y0|Λ0)
− E(X1Y1|Λ0)|.
(71)
By using Eq. (64) and Eq. (66), Eq. (71) can be deduced
as
ICHSH ≤4(1− δ) + [sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + 2
√
1
4
− ǫ2
(cosψ1 − cosψ2)]δ
=4 + [sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + 2
√
1
4
− ǫ2
(cosψ1 − cosψ2)− 4]δ.
(72)
Next, we give the relation between δ and detection
efficiency η as follow:
δ ≥ 3− 2
η
. (73)
proof For j′ 6= j, p(ΛXj′ |ΛXjYk) is given by
p(ΛXj′ |ΛXjYk) =
p(ΛXj′Yj |ΛYk)
p(ΛXj |ΛYk)
=
p(ΛXj′ |ΛBk) + p(ΛXj |ΛYk)− p(ΛXj′ ∪ ΛXj |ΛYk)
p(ΛXj |ΛYk)
≥2η − 1
η
.
(74)
where we assume that the detection efficiency of
each party is independent and constant rate, that is,
p(ΛXj′ |ΛYk) = p(ΛXj |ΛYk) = η.
Furthermore, when j′ 6= j and k′ 6= k,
p(ΛXj′Yk′ |ΛXjYk) can be deduced by
p(ΛXj′Yk′ |ΛXjYk) = p(ΛXj′ |ΛXjYk) + p(ΛYk′ |ΛXjYk)
− p(ΛXj′ ∪ ΛYk′ |ΛXjYk)
≥ 2η − 1
η
+
2η − 1
η
− 1
= 3− 2
η
.
(75)
Finally, we calculate δ. Without loss of generality, as-
sume that j = 1, k = 1, p(Λ0|ΛX1Y1) can be represented
as
p(Λ0|ΛX1Y1) = p(ΛX0X1Y0Y1 |ΛX1Y1)
=p(ΛX0Y0 ∩ ΛX1Y1 |ΛX1Y1)
=p(ΛX0Y0 |ΛX1Y1) + p(ΛX1Y1 |ΛX1Y1)− p(ΛX0Y0∪
ΛX1Y1 |ΛX1Y1)
≥p(ΛX0Y0 |ΛX1Y1)
≥3− 2
η
,
(76)
where the fifth line holds since p(ΛX1Y1 |ΛX1Y1) =
1, p(ΛX0Y0∪ΛX1Y1 |ΛX1Y1) ≤ 1. The sixth line holds based
on Eq. (75).
So, we get
δ ≥ 3− 2
η
. (77)
⊓⊔
Input Eq. (73) into Eq. (72), we obtain
ICHSH ≤
8− 2[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + 2
√
1
4 − ǫ2
η
(cosψ1 − cosψ2)] − 8 + 3[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2)
+ 2
√
1
4
− ǫ2(cosψ1 − cosψ2)].
(78)
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Here, in order to demonstrate there exists an
attack strategy, we only consider ICHSH =
8−2[sin θ(sinψ1+sinψ2)+2
√
1
4
−ǫ2(cosψ1−cosψ2)]
η
− 8 +
3[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + 2
√
1
4 − ǫ2(cosψ1 − cosψ2)].
Next, we prove that the above value violates the rela-
tion (17) in some cases. Let
A = sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2), (79)
B = cosψ1 − cosψ2, (80)
C = (8 − 2A+B)η − 8 + 2A. (81)
On the basis of [22], the detection loophole of CHSH
Bell test can be closed when η > 2
1+
√
2
.
(1) when η < 8−2A8−2A+B , we get
(8 − 2A+B)η − 8 + 2A < 0. (82)
Now, when ǫ ∈ (− 12 , 0) ∪ (0, 12 ), we get
2(3η − 2)B
√
1
4
− ǫ2 > (8 − 2A+B)η − 8 + 2A, (83)
since (3η−2)B
√
1
4 − ǫ2 > 0 and (8−2A+B)η−8+2A <
0.
In the above case, we get
Eq.(21)− Eq.(18) =
2(3η − 2)B
√
1
4 − ǫ2 − [(8− 2A
η
+B)η + 8− 2A]
.
(84)
On the basis of the relation (83), we know
Eq.(21)− Eq.(18) > 0. (85)
Hence, Eq. (21) can violate the relation Eq. (18) in the
above case.
(2) when 8−2A8−2A+B < η <
8−2A−2B
8−2A−2B , we get
(8− 2A−B)η − 8 + 2A > 0, (86)
(8− 2A− 2B)η < 8− 2A− 2B. (87)
Eq. (87) can be rewritten as (3η−2)B− [(8−2A+B)η−
8 + 2A] > 0. That is, (3η − 2)B > C > 0.
Further, when ǫ ∈ (−
√
(3η−2)2B2−C2
2(3η−2)B , 0) ∪
(0,
√
(3η−2)2B2−C2
2(3η−2)B ), we get
4(3η − 2)2B2ǫ2 < (3η − 2)2B2 − C2. (88)
So, we have
2(3η − 2)B
√
1
4
− ǫ2 > C > 0. (89)
On the basis of the relation (89), we know
Eq.(21)− Eq.(18) > 0. (90)
Hence, Eq. (21) can violate the relation Eq. (17) in the
above case. ⊓⊔
Appendix E: The deduction of Eq.(31)
In the perfect detector scenario (η = 1), we can assert
that Eq. (18) has self-tested the state and measurements
in the predetermined forms. When η is no larger than a
certain value, Alice takes advantage of the detector inef-
ficiency such that Bob still gets the result (18). In fact,
the state and measurements are not in the predetermined
form. Now, Alice can get more information about items
without being discovered by Bob. In order to avoid this
cheat strategy, more precisely, Eq. (18) can be rewritten
as
E(X0Y0|Λ0) + E(X0Y1|Λ0) + E(X1Y0|Λ0)− E(X1Y1|Λ0)
= sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2,
(91)
where Λ0 = ΛX0Y0X1Y1 represents the ensemble that
an arbitrary measurement pair gives the nonempty out-
comes (i.e., a′, b′ ∈ {+1,−1}).
Next, the deduction of Eq. (31) is similar to that of
Eq. (21). While, the difference between them lies in the
relation (72). In the deduction of Eq. (31), ICHSH can
be rewritten as
ICHSH ≤4(1− δ) + [sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2]δ
=4 + [sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2 − 4]δ.
(92)
Input Eq. (73) into Eq. (92), we obtain
ICHSH ≤ 8− 2[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2]
η
− 8 + 3[sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2].
(93)
Hence, denote I¯CHSH as
8−2[sin θ(sinψ1+sinψ2)+cosψ1−cosψ2]
η
−8 + 3[sin θ(sinψ1 +
sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2].
⊓⊔
13
[1] B. Chor, O. Goldreich, E. Kushilevitz, M. Sudan, J. ACM
45,965-981 (1998)
[2] Y. Gertner, Y. Ishai, E. Kushilevitz, T. Malkin, J. Com-
put. Syst. Sci. 60, 592-629 (2000)
[3] H. K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 56, 1154-1162 (1997)
[4] V. Giovannetti, S. Lloyd, L. Maccone, Phys. Rev. Lett.
100, 230502 (2008)
[5] V. Giovannetti, S. Lloyd, L. Maccone, IEEE T. Inform.
Theory 56, 3465-3477 (2010)
[6] F. DeMartini, V. Giovannetti, S. Lloyd, L. Maccone, E.
Nagali, L. Sansoni, F. Sciarrino, Phys. Rev. A 80,010302
(2009)
[7] L. Olejnik, Phys. Rev. A 84, 022313 (2011)
[8] M. Jakobi, C. Simon, N. Gisin, J. D. Bancal, C.
Branciard, N. Walenta, H. Zbinden, Phys. Rev. A
80,022301(2009)
[9] V. Scarani, A. Ac´ın, G. Ribordy, N. Gisin, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 92, 057901 (2004)
[10] F. Gao, B. Liu, Q. Y. Wen, H. Chen, Opt. Express 20,
17411 (2012)
[11] J. L. Zhang, F. Z. Guo, F. Gao, B. Liu, Q. Y. Wen, Phys.
Rev. A 88, 022334 (2014)
[12] Y. G. Yang, S. J. Sun, J. Tian, Quan. Inform. Procce.
13, 805-813 (2014)
[13] F. Gao, B. Liu, W. Huang, and Q. Y. Wen, IEEE J. Sel.
Top. Quant. 21,6600111 (2015).
[14] P. Chan, I. X. Mo. Lucio-Martinezm , C. Simon, W. Tit-
tel, Scientific Reports 4, 5233 (2014)
[15] B. Liu, F. Gao, W. Huang, Q. Y. Wen, Science China
Physics, Mechanics & Astronomy 58, 100301 (2015)
[16] C. Y. Wei, X. Q. Cai, B. Liu, T. Y. Wang, and F. Gao,
IEEE T. Comput. 67, 2 (2018).
[17] F. Gao, S. J. Qin, W. Huang, Q.Y. Wen, Sci. China-Phys.
Mech. Astron. 62, 70301 (2019).
[18] L. Y. Zhao, Z. Q. Yin, W. Chen, Y. J. Qian, C. M. Zhang,
G. C. Guo, Z. F. Han, Sci. Rep. 7, 39733 (2017)
[19] A. Maitra, G. Paul, S. Roy, Phys. Rev. A 95, 042344
(2017)
[20] C. C. W. Lim, C. Portmann, M. Tomamichel, R. Renner,
and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. X 3, 031006 (2013)
[21] N. Brunner, D. Cavalcanti, S. Pironio, et al. Reviews of
Modern Physics 86, 839 (2014)
[22] J. -A˚. Larsson, Phys. Rev. A 57, 3304 (1998)
[23] W. Hoeffding, J. AM. Stat. Assoc. 58, 13 (2013)
